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SECTIONS 2(d) AND 2(e) OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
SELLER IN A QUANDARY
JESSE D. MILLER*
As a matter of common sense, a person engaged in the sale of goods
who desires in complete good faith to establish pricing and merchandis-
ing policies which will maximize his sales efforts, as well as fully com-
ply with existing law," should have no trouble doing so. But anyone
who has attempted to reach this apparently modest goal has undoubtedly
found the task of wending his way through the maze of legislation af-
fecting the problem extremely difficult. Chief among the roadblocks is
the Robinson-Patman Act.2 This Act has been described as "the most
awkwardly drafted of all anti-trust legislation, ' 3 and various of its pro-
visions have been euphemistically referred to as being "a legislative mon-
trosity"4 and as containing "infelicitous language." 5
The Robinson-Patman Act is, broadly speaking, an act which pro-
hibits, absent certain conditions, discrimination in price among buyers
of a seller's goods. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Acte refers to
and regulates direct and indirect discriminatons in price.7 Section 2(c)
*Associate, Foley, Sammond & Lardner, Milwaukee; B.S., 1956, UCLA; LL.B.,
1959, Harvard. Member, Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association.I Despite some popular opinion to the contrary, the writer is convinced that
such sellers in fact exist. It is for them, and their attorneys, that this article
is written.
249 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1958).
3 VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 25 (2d ed. 1958).
4 Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act be Amended?, CCH ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN AcT SYmpoSium 141, 146 (1948).
5 Automatic Canteen Company of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 346
U.S. 61, 78 (1953).
6 The Robinson-Patman Act is actually an amendment of the Clayton Act,
and what was actually Section 1 of the amendment became Section 2 of the
Clayton Act. All references in this article to sections of the Robinson-Patman
Act are to the number of the section as it appears in the Clayton Act, as
amended. This is consistent with accepted legal parlance.
749 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(2) (a) (1958). The provisions of Section
2 (a), in full are:
"Sec. 2. (a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or in-
directly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such com-
modities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any
insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only
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of the Act prohibits payment, in connection with the specific transaction
of what may be generally called "brokerage commissions" by the seller
to the buyer, or the buyer's agent, broker or other intermediary.,
While Section 2 (a) relates to discrimination in price, Section 2(d)
relates to discrimination in payments by a seller to a customer for
services, including advertising, furnished by or through the customer.9
Section 2(e) relates to discrimination in the furnishing of services,10
including advertising, by a seller to the purchasers of his goods." Thus,
due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or de-
livery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: Provided, how-
ever, That the Federal Trade Commission may, after due investigation
and hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish quantity limits,
and revise the same as it finds necessary as to particular commodities
or classes of commodities, where it finds that available purchasers ingreater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account
thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line
of commerce; and the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit
differentials based on differences in quantities greater than those sofixed and established: And provided further, That nothing herein
contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or
merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona
fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: And provided further,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time
to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the marketfor or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited
to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence
of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good
faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned."8 This article does not consider Sections 2 (a) and 2 (c) in detail except where
detail is necessary for a better understanding of Sections 2 (d) and 2 (e)here under analysis. Sections 2 (a) and 2 (c) have been the subjects of numer-
ous commentaries and a good starting point for anyone interested in analyses
of those sections is AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (2d rev. ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited asAusTiN]. All persons interested in the Robinson-Patman Act generally are
greatly indebted to Mr. Austin for this work.
949 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(2) (d) (1958). Section 2 (d) provides in
full as follows:
"2 (d) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or
for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such
commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facili-
ties furnished by or through such customer in connection with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or com-
modities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unlesspayment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to
all other customers competing in the distribution of such products
or commodities."
10 The statutory language refers to "services or facilties" in Sections 2 (d) and
2 (e). In the interests of brevity the word "services" is used herein as in-
cluding services and facilities. Actually, the furnishing of payment for facili-
ties would seem to be a service.
149 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(2) (e) (1958), Section 2 (e) provides
in full as follows:
"2 (e) That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate infavor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a
commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by contract-
ing to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of,
any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale,
I Vol. 45
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Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are two sides of the same coin. The significant
point is that the buyer ends up with the same thing-namely, a service
for which he has not incurred any net expense-whether he first pays for
it and is reimbursed by the seller, or whether the seller furnishes the
service directly. Nevertheless, a close reading of the two sections re-
veals a number of differences in the language used, and, as will be dis-
cussed later, the two sections have not always received a uniform con-
struction. Furthermore, a number of unanswered potential problems
are posed by the apparently inconsistent language.
A seller must reckon with Sections 2(d) and 2(e) when he wishes
to engage in what shall be termed "cooperative merchandising services"
to promote the resale of his goods. This term is used since any service
which promotes the resale of the goods benefits both the original seller
and the reseller. The most common types of "cooperative merchandising
services" are cooperative advertising, distribution of promotional ma-
terials such as window and counter displays, and providing or paying
for demonstrators and other trained salespersons to assist the reseller
to make sales of the seller's products. It is a rare seller who has as cus-
tomers a homogeneous group, each member of which will find suitable
any one cooperative merchandising service. For example, a manufactur-
ing firm which sells to retail outlets will undoubtedly number among
its accounts some large stores, some medium sized stores and some small
stores. The larger accounts might very well be able and willing to par-
ticipate in a cooperative advertising program using large, metropolitan
newspapers as the advertising medium. The small stores might not be
able to afford such ads, or such ads might not be practical for them
because of location or some other reason. If a seller engaged in com-
merce, had a program whereby he paid the larger customer part of the
cost of such newspaper ads, and offered no alternatives which could be
used by the small stores, he would undoubtedly be held to have violated
Section 2(d) in that such payment would not be "available on propor-
tionally equal terms" to all of his competing customers. This is but one
limited example of the problems a seller must solve if his "cooperative
merchandising" plan is to conform to the requirements of Sections 2(d)
and 2(e). This article will certainly not solve the problems which sellers
face; but it is hoped that it will delineate broad guide lines as to what
transactions are covered by Sections 2(d) and 2(e), what defenses to
charges of violation are available, what types of programs the Federal
Trade Commission and various courts have held do or do not comply
with the Sections, and what may be the consequences of violating Sec-
tions 2(d) and 2 (e).
or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not ac-
corded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms."
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I. TRANSACTIONS COVERED BY SECTIONS 2(d) AND 2(e).
It should be noted at the outset that under the law the seller has a
right to select his customers,'12 but having done so he must treat them
with proportional equality.' 3 And it is likewise well settled that the de
minimis rule applies to actions under Sections 2(d) and 2(e)."4
Section 2(d) is expressly applicable to persons engaged in com-
merce. Section 2(e) does not mention commerce. And Section 2(a) ap-
plies where "either or any of the purchases. . . are in commerce." Thus,
if the literal interpretation is followed, the stage is set for some in-
consistent rulings. But, when the constitutionality of Section 2(e) was
challenged because it purported to affect intrastate sales, two Courts of
Appeals have read Section 2(e) as if it contained the words "engaged
in commerce" and "in the course of such commerce."' 15 And, it has been
held under Section 2(e) that an interstate purchaser may complain be-
cause of advertising furnished to an intrastate purchaser. 6 And Section
2(e) was properly invoked where an intrastate retailer complained of
services furnished to interstate retailers 7 Section 2(d) by its express
terms clearly applies to the latter-type transaction. But, there is some
question as to whether or not it applies to the former. Section 2(a), by
its terms, applied to both situations but 2(d) and 2(e) are to be con-
strued independently from 2(a).Y8 A respectable argument can be made,
based on the literal terms of Section 2(d), that it does not apply when
12 Section 2 (a) expressly provides "That nothing herein contained shall prevent
persons engaged in selling goods . . . in commerce from selecting their own
customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade. . . ." As
will be seen later, the provisions of §2 (a) do not necessarily apply to §§2
(d) and 2 (e). However, there is no question but that this is the law ap-
plicable to §§2 (d) and 2 (e). Chicago Seating Company v. S. Karpen &
Bros., 177 F. 2d 863 (7th Cir. 1949).
13 "In other words, manufacturers will have a right to select their customers
but when selected they must deal with them equally and fairly." 80 Cong.
Rec. 7759 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Patman).
14 Skinner v. United States Steel Corporation, 233 F. 2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956).
The plaintiff operated a retail hardware store and defendant's counsel con-
tended that the record showed plaintiff's only purchase from defendant
which moved in commerce was one dozen nails which cost plaintiff 85c. The
court noted that this "perhaps" approached the deininirnis level, but the
question was not decided since the court found on other grounds that §2 (e)
was not violated.
15 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F. 2d (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
18 Corn Products Refining Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S.
726 (1945). There the court also noted that the service furnished (adver-
tising) was also itself frequently in commerce. See, also, Bowman Dairy
Company v. Hedlin Dairy Company, 126 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. 11. 1954).
17 Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc., v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation, 178 F. 2d
150 (2d Cir. 1949).
28 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55 (1959);
Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 156 F. 2d 132, 135 (2d
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947): "We see no reason why the
limitations contained in (a), or their equivalent, should be read into (e)."
See, also, Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., No. 6212, F.T.C., June 21, 1956.
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the discrimination favors an intrastate purchaser. But, it is considered
very likely that broader scope will be given to Section 2(d) and that it
will apply where "either or any" of the competing customers were en-
gaged in commerce3 9
A further question arises because Section 2(d) prohibits discrimina-
tory payments to "a customer of [the seller]" while Section 2(e) is lit-
erally broader in prohibiting the furnishing of discriminatory services
to "purchasers" without any words limiting the prohibition to purchasers
from the seller. Thus, Section 2(e) was held in Elizabeth Arden20 to
prohibit discrimination in furnishing services to retailers who purchase
directly from the seller, on the one hand, and retailers who purchase
indirectly from intervening wholesalers. In that case, however, the
manufacturer furnished demonstrators directly to both direct-and in-
direct-buying retailers. A later case interprets Elizabeth Arden as ap-
plicable, in a 2(e) case, only when there is a direct relationship between
the retailer and both types of purchasers, either through direct sales or
direct furnishing of services.21
But, should the words "customer of such person" in 2(d) be con-
strued to relate only to direct-buying customers? It is suggested that
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) be construed uniformly, since, as noted above,
Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are actually "twins,' 22 in the sense that they
seek to prevent the same ultimate evil-the realization by the buyer of
a service without cost. Therefore, these sections should be interpreted
as prohibiting discrimination in furnishing of services or payment for
services by a manufacturer or between a direct and an indirect pur-
chaser as well as between direct purchasers and between indirect pur-
chasers. This has been indicated as the "safe course" for a counsellor
on the subject to follow. 23 And further support is lent to the conclusion
by a decision that a violation of Section 2(d) may occur when a manu-
facturer gives a retailer an allowance not given to a wholesaler whose
customers compete with such retailer.2 4
9 AusTiN, 127.
20 Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir.
. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
21 Skinner v. United States Steel Corporation, 233 F. 2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956).
22 "To the fullest extent Sections 2 (d) and 2 (e) should be interpreted to
reconcile their basic purposes. I see no reason why a distinction should be
made between these twins of the Robinson-Patman Act." Exquisite Form
Brassiere, Inc., No. 6966 F.T.C., Nov. 25, 1960 (Commissioner Tait, dis-
senting). The dissenting Commissioner was vindicated when the majority
opinion was reversed in Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, CCH 1961 Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cases) 570,157 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 22, 1961).23 AusTx, 135. For an argument that the Commission ought to apply the indirect
purchaser concept only in circumstances where the wholesaler is little more
than a conduit through whom the goods pass, see, Sniderman, Collateral Dis-
crinmination Under the Robinson-Patman Act-Section 2(c), (d), and (e), 17
A.B.A., ANTmruST SEcrio 410, 417 (1960).24 Krug v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation, 142 F. Supp. 230
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A very practical question is in order at this point. Must a seller,
whose sales in question are subject to Sections 2(d) and 2(e), and who
has put into effect a proper cooperative-merchandising plan on some of
his products make the services or payments under the plan available
with respect to other of his products? The question is meaningful be-
cause Sections 2(d) and 2(e) do not contain the limitation contained
in Section 2(a) prohibiting discrimination in price "between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality." Products are
often competitive (at a differential in price) although they differ some-
what in grade and quality.2 5 Under the words of Sections 2(d) and
2(e) it would have been possible to interpret the sections as requiring
a seller who wanted to establish a cooperative-merchandising program
for product A to extend the promotional benefits to buyers of other of
his products which might be considered competitive with product A,
even though of different grade and quality. However, the question has
been squarely passed upon in the Atalanta Trading Corporation case .2
There Atalanta granted promotional allowances on its canned hams,
pork shoulders and pre-cooked bacon. The Federal Trade Commission
sought a ruling that Section 2(d) required Atalanta to offer propor-
tionally equal allowances on its entire line of pork products. The Court
of Appeals relied upon earlier precedent under Section 2(d)27 and held
that "such products" in Section 2(d) means products of like grade and
quality. Thus, even though the other pork products of Atalanta were
to some extent competitive with the bacon, ham and pork shoulder on
which allowances were given, Section 2(d) did not require "propor-
tionally equal" allowances as to the other pork products. There can be
little doubt that Section 2(e) will be similarly interpreted, especially
because there is no difference of substance between the language used
in 2(d) and 2(e) on this subject and because of the desirability of a
uniform construction of the two sections.28
The provisions of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) are ambiguous and in-
consistent in the respect that Section 2(e) refers to "a commodity
bought for resale" and to services connected with the "processing,
handling, sales, or offering for sale of the commodity so purchased," and
Section 2(d) refers to payments for services in connection with the
"processing, handling, sale or offering for sale" of products made, sold
or offered for sale by the seller paying for the services. Thus, 2(d) may
(D.N.J. 1956). But cf., Klein v. Lionel Corporation, 237 F. 2d 13 (3d Cir.
1956).
25 E.g., different grades of gasoline or eggs or tires are competitive.26 Atalanta Trading Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 F. 2d 365
(2d Cir. 1958).
27Golf Ball Mfgrs. Assn., 26 F.T.C. 824, 851 (1938), and Henry Rosenfeld,
Inc., No. 6212, F.T.C., June 21, 1956.
28 See supra note 22.
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include payment for services in connection with the sale of other goods
to other customers. The Commission has so construed Section 2(d) in
the U.S. Rubber Company29 case. There, the Rubber Company sold
tires to certain oil companies. These oil companies were paid a commis-
sion on sales of tires by the Rubber Company to gasoline stations
handling the oil companies' products. The Commission found that the
sales commissions were paid in return for services furnished by the oil
companies, which services were the exercise of influence and giving of
sales assistance. These payments were in no way connected with the
resale of the tires sold to the oil companies. It is to be hoped that this
decision will not be followed, since the result does not seem to effectuate
the purpose of 2(d) which is directed at evils connected with the resale
of the original goods. Furthermore, it results in a conflict of inter-
pretation with Section 2(e), the language of which limits it to services
connected with resale. And 2(e) has been so applied by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 30 And in the General Foods31 case, the Commis-
sion applied Section 2(d) in a manner consistent with the "resale"
theory. There, General Foods sold its food products direct to hotels
and other institutional buyers. It also sold to distributors who resold to
others. In some cases, when sales were made directly to the institutional
buyers, the seller directed a distributor to make delivery to the institu-
tion out of the distributor's own stock. The distributor was reimbursed
for the product delivered by a stock credit and a cash payment for the
service of storage and delivery. This payment for storage and delivery
was not available to other competing General Foods distributors. It was
held that 2(d) was not violated since it was not made to the distributor
as a customer or in conjunction with the resale of goods bought by him
from the seller. It is believed that Sections 2(d) and 2(e) will be in-
terpreted uniformly in this respect and that they will apply only to
services connected with resale.32
It is significant to note, in passing, the provisions of Section 2(f) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. 33 By its terms it does not apply to dis-
criminations under Sections 2(d) and 2(e), but it makes it unlawful
for a buyer to knowingly induce or receive a discrimination in price
29 United States Rubber Company, 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939).
30 Skinner v. United States Steel Corporation, 233 F. 2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956). In
this case the service in question was withholding by the seller from its em-
ployee's wages the price of goods purchased by the employees of the seller
from the buyer. This was held not to be a merchandising service and hence
not prohibited by 2 (e).
31 General Foods Corporation, No. 6018, F.T.C., Feb. 15, 1956.
32 AusT N, 136, 137.
3349 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(2) (f) (1958). This section provides in full
as follows:
"2 (f) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a dis-
crimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
1962]
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under Section 2(a). Although, a buyer may not be guilty of a violation
of Section 2(f) for knowingly inducing or receiving a discrimination
in violation of Sections 2(d) or 2(e), it has been held that he has en-
gaged in an unfair method of competition 34 under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.3 5
II. DEFENSES AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCRIMINATION UNDER
SECTIONS 2(d) AND 2(e).
If it is assumed that a seller has discriminated by paying for services
under Section 2(d) or furnishing services under Section 2(e) to one
customer without making the same terms available to all competing
customers on proportionally equal terms, the question arises: Are there
any defenses or justifications available to the seller which will preserve
the legality of his conduct? By way of answer, it is well to examine
seriatim certain defenses or justifications which have come to be asso-
ciated with offenses under the Robinson-Patman Act.
A. Cost Justification
In Section 2(a), 36 a proviso permits a seller to justify what would
otherwise be an unlawful price discrimination by showing that the lower
price charged one purchaser was based upon savings in the cost of
manufacture, sale or delivery brought about by differing methods or
quantities in which the goods are sold or delivered. This is described in
shorthand as "cost justification." There is no such proviso in Sections
2(d) and 2(e). However, Section 2(b) 37 places upon the person charged
the burden of rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination in "price
34The Federal Trade Commission has consistently taken the position that in-
ducing a violation of §2 (d) or §2 (e) of Robinson-Patman was an unfair
method of competition. The Grand Union Co., No. 6973, F.T.C., Oct. 16, 1959,
and J. Weingarten, Inc. et al., Nos. 7714-7722, Jan. 5, 1960. This position has
been upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in two recent cases.
Grand Union Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, CCH 1962 Trade Reg. Rep.(1962 Trade Cases) 570,224 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 1962), and American News Co.
et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, CCH 1962 Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade
Cases) 570,225 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 1962). An appeal on this point is now pending
in the District of Columbia, Court of Appeals. Giant Food, Inc., v. Federal
Trade Commission, (D.C. Cir. 16507), appeal from Grant Food, Inc., No.
7773, F.T.C., Apr. 20, 1961.
35 38 Stat. 717, as amended (1914), 15 U.S.C. §41 (1958).
36 See supra note 7 for the full text of §2 (a).
3749 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(2) (b) (1958). Section 2 (b) provides in
full as follows:
'T (b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under
this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or
facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-fade case thus
made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with
a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating
the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by show-
ing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor."
[Vol. 45
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or services or facilities" by showing "justification." What is meant by
"justification" in Section 2(b) was until recently an open question. The
definition has now been supplied by the United States Supreme Court
in Simplicity Pattern.38 In this case, among the defenses urged to a
charge of violating Section 2(e) by Simplicity was "cost justification."
It was argued on behalf of Simplicity that this defense was available for
two reasons: (1) The proviso in Section 2(a) should be read into Sec-
tion 2(e) ; (2) the word "justification" in Section 2(b) has a substantive
content and what constitutes "justifiction" is a matter to be determined
upon the facts of each case as it arises. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled that this defense was available on the second
ground advanced, but not on the first. One judge dissented on the ground
that the proviso of 2(a) should be read into 2(e).1°
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
holding that the only defenses available under 2(e) are those, if any,
contained in Section 2(e) itself and those in 2(b) expressly applicable
to 2(e). There are no built-in defenses set forth in Section 2(e) itself
and therefore the Court looked to Section 2(b). There, a proviso per-
mits the seller to show that his furnishing of services to a purchaser
was made in good faith to meet services furnished by a competitor. This
is the so-called "meeting competition" defense. Thus this defense is
expressly applicable to Section 2(e) and it is the only defense in 2(b)
so applicable. The Supreme Court construed the word "justification"
in 2(b) to be limited to the defense of "meeting competition" expressly
set forth in 2(b) and any defenses built into the particular section under
which the seller is charged (such as "cost justification" in Section 2(a)).
This, then, is the law-the defense of "cost justification" is not
available for a 2(e) offense (and by implication, neither is it available
for an offense under 2(d) ). Though it must now be accepted as the law,
the Supreme Court's holding seems unduly restrictive. It seems anomal-
ous that a direct discrimination in price prohibited by Section 2(a) may
be "cost justified" while a discrimination in allowances and services
under Sections 2(d) and 2(e) cannot be so justified. It is difficult to see
what policy is advanced by such a result. The only reason advanced
by the Supreme Court is feeble:
... In allowing a 'cost justification' for price discriminations
and not for others, Congress could very well have felt that sellers
would be forced to confine their discriminatory practices to price
differentials, where they could be more readily detected and
where it would be much easier to make accurate comparisons with
any alleged cost savings.40
88 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
39 Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 F. 2d 673,
681 and n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1958).40 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., supra note 38, at
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It would also seem that the position taken in the Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws41 is much
sounder. It was there concluded that a "cost justification" defense should
be available under 2(d) and 2(e) in view of the "broader antitrust
objectives" to be served by these Sections. 42
B. Absence of Competitive Injury
Section 2(a) prohibits price discrimination, the effect of which is
to injure competition. Sections 2(d) and 2(e) do not expressly require
that there be an adverse effect on competition resulting from a discrimin-
ation in paying for or furnishing services. Can a seller defend against a
charge of violation of Section 2(d) or Section 2(e) on the ground that
there has been no injury to competition? The Supreme Court of the
United States answered "No" in Simplicity Pattern.4 3 In that case,
Simplicity sold tissue patterns to two types of buyers: variety stores,
called "Red Fronts," which resold the patterns for a profit; and, fabric
stores, which sold the patterns at a small profit or even a loss only as an
accommodation to its fabric purchasers. Simplicity made available at no
charge to the "Red Fronts" catalogs and cabinets for filing patterns for
which the fabric stores were required to pay. The Court held that the
two types of buyers competed with each other, but accepted the Ex-
aminer's finding that there was "no showing of competitive injury."4 4
Nevertheless, the Court held that Simplicity violated Section 2(e), since
unlike Section 2(a), that Section did not require a showing of injury
to competition.
Thus, it is settled that Section 2(e) defines a per se offense, and it
is certain that Section 2(d) will be similarly construed. At the same
time, Section 2(a) requires proof of injury to competition. As one
leading commentator had put it:
• .* There seems to be little logic in making disproportionate
but bona fide allowances or services to competing purchasers
(which may not amount to a discrimination in price) create, in
effect, a conclusive presumption of injurious effect upon com-
petition, whereas the charging of different prices to competing
purchasers is only prima facie evidence of such injury.45
67, 68. Nor is the Court's conclusion that it is "not in a position to review
the economic wisdom of Congress" persuasive. Courts have enjoyed great
latitude in interpreting the Robinson-Patman Act, since the patently ambiguous
and inconsistent provisions of the Act require such latitude if the Act is to
have any rational meaning.
41Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. (1955) [hereinafter cited as Att'y
Gen. Comm.].
42Id. at 193. It was there suggested that §§2(d) and 2(e) should be so con-
strued by "interpretive reform."
4 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., supra note 38.
44 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., supra note 38, at 63.
45 AUSTIN 122.
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It seems clear that logic and "broader antitrust objectives"' 6 would be
better served by a contrary holding.47
C. Meeting Competition.
As discussed under the "Cost Justification" heading above, the lan-
guage of Section 2(b) expressly states that a seller who has discrimi-
nated under Section 2(e) may justify the discrimination by showing
that he furnished services to "meet... the services or facilities furnished
by a competitor. '4 8 This is the so-called "meeting competition" defense.
Section 2(b) does not, by its terms, apply to offenses under 2(d). The
Commission has consistently held, reading the sections literally, that the
''meeting competition" defense is not available to a charge of violation
under Section 2(d).49 However, first a Federal District Court50 in a
private suit for damages, and more recently the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia,5 1 have held that the close interrelationship
between Sections 2 (d) and 2 (e) requires that the "meeting competition"
defense is available under 2(d) as well as under 2(e). These rulings
would seem to be sound in serving to treat violations under 2(d) the
same as violations under 2(e) and thereby reconciling their basic pur-
poses. However, the Commission has indicated that it will not accept
the court's ruling in Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission 2 without a fight. It will seek a ruling from the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in a case now pending there 3 that "meeting
competition" is not a defense under 2(d), and it has contended in its
brief that the Exquisite Form ruling "ignores the plain purpose of Con-
gress in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act."54
Salutary as it is, it is probable that the ruling in Exquisite Form
will be short-lived. The literal reading given to the various sections of
Robinson-Patman in Simplicity Pattern5 5 indicates that the Supreme
46 Att'y Gen. Comm. 193.
47 For an argument that the legislative history of §2(e) points toward a contrary
holding, see Note, The Simplicity Pattern Case: Robinson-Patnian Con-founded, 68 YALE L. 3. 808, 824-25 (1959). See, for a similar contention, 72
HARv. L. REV. 385, 387 (1958).
48 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., supra note 38
makes it clear in dictum that the "meeting competition" defense is available
under §2 (e).
49 E.g., Shulton, Inc., No. 7721, F.T.C., Jan. 30, 1961; Henry Rosenfeld, Inc.,
No. 6212, F.T.C., June 29, 1956.5oDelmar Construction Company v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, CCH
1961 Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cases) 569,947 (S.D.Fla. 1961).
51Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, CCH 1961
Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cases) 570,157 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 27, 1961).
52 Ibid.
53 Shulton, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, (7th Cir., No. 13508), appeal
from Shulton, Inc. supra note 49. But see J. A. Folger Co., 1962 CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. No. 19, January 22, 1962 (to be reported) where an F.T.C. Ex-
aminer seemed to recognize that the "meeting competition" defense is avail-
able under §2 (d).
54 Shulton, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 49 (F.T.C. Brief).
55 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., supra note 38.
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Court would likely rule that since Section 2(d) contains no built-in
defenses, and since Section 2(b) does not expressly refer to 2(d),
"meeting competition" is not a defense under 2(d) .56
D. Summary of Defenses.
The only defense available to a charge of violation of Section 2(d)
or Section 2(e) is that of "meeting competition." No other defenses are
built into these sections. Section 2(b) does not add any substantive
"justifications" to discriminations under 2(d) or 2(e) and the provisos
of Section 2(a) are not to be read as applying to 2(d) or 2(e). 57 And
the availability of the "meeting competition" defense under 2(d) is by
no means settled, so that all that can be said with safety is that a charge
of violation of Section 2(e) is subject to the defense that the seller in
good faith met services furnished by a competitor.
III. COOPERATIVE-MERCHANDISING PROGRAMS-REQUIREMENTS FOR
COMPLIANCE.
If a seller decides to make payments for services to some of his
customers, he must make payments "available on proportionally equal
terms" to all other customers, under Section 2(d). If he decides to fur-
nish services to some customers, he must "accord" all other customers
''proportionally equal terms." For a clearer understanding of these
terms, it is desirable to examine them separately.
A. Available-Accorded.
Section 2(d) uses the word "available" while 2(e) says "accorded."
There is nothing in the legislative history which suggests a difference
in meaning between the two terms,58 and they have been treated as hav-
ing the same meaning.59 Therefore, the word "available" is used herein as
if it applied to both Sections 2(d) and 2(e).
The first step in making a cooperative-merchandising program avail-
able is for the seller to notify all his customers of the program and to
offer it to them.60 The notification and offer can probably be accomplished
by any means reasonably calculated to reach all customers. For example,
publication of the offer in trade journals to which all customers sub-
scribe would probably constitute proper notice, while such publication
would be insufficient in an industry where many customers never read
trade journals. 61 However, notification of all customers may not be nec-
56 At the time of this writing, no application for certiorari has been filed in
connection with the Exquisite Form case. However, it seems inevitable that
this question will shortly be presented to the Supreme Court.
57 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., supra note 38.
58 AuSTIN 140.59 Att'y Gen. Comm. 189.
60 Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., No. 6212, F.T.C., June 29, 1956.
61 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., No. 6966, F.T.C., Nov. 25, 1960, rez'd on
other grounds, CCH 1961 Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cases) 570,157
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essary if the seller can show that it would have been a futile act to
notify those customers who were not notified, since they would not
have participated in the program.6 2 However, it would seem that in
almost all cases, all customers should be notified, and they, not the seller,
should determine whether or not they are interested in participation. 63
And, it is important to note that terms upon which merchandising pay-
ments or services are granted may not be justified by subsequent events;
they must be openly offered and available to all customers from the out-
set of the program.64
It is not enough to offer the program to all competing customers, but
the terms must be such that all competing customers can accept, if they
so desire. It is said in State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Company,
an offer to make a service available to one, the economic status
of whose business renders him unable to accept the offer, is tanta-
mount to no offer to him.65
In that case, the sellers sold products to A & P as well as to the plaintiffs.
The sellers purchased advertising in Woman's Day magazine (as a result
of which the case is commonly referred to as the Woman's Day case),
which magazine had wide circulation and was published by a wholly
owned subsidiary of A & P. The plaintiffs published no magazines, but
since the sellers paid A & P (through its subsidiary) for advertising,
and since they did not make such payments "available" to plaintiffs on
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 1961). The Commission held that the plan was not made
available when publicized in trade journals in view of the testimony of wit-
nesses who had evidently not read the publications. There the publication was
not made until some sixteen months after the plan was put into effect. The
Commission seemed to treat the time lag as an additional reason why the
plan was not available, apparently holding that the fact that some buyers
had not read the trade journals was a sufficient independent ground.62Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 6642, F.T.C., Sept. 9, 1959. "The
question of whether the gesture would be futile is one of fact. Where it is
disclosed that a seller [sic) generally does not want promotional allowances,
it may be shown by the party charged with the violation that in such a case
to offer an allowance would be a futile act."63 Chestnut Farms - Chevy Chase Dairy Co., 53 F.T.C. 1050 (1957).
64Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). Here the seller paid a demonstrator's full
salary to one buyer and one-half of the salary of a demonstrator to the
plaintiff, a competing buyer. The seller had not notified the plaintiff in ad-
vance that the percentage of the demonstrator's salary paid would depend
on volume of purchases. The seller sought to show that the plaintiff purchased
only one-half as much as the other buyer and that he was thus entitled only
to one-half as much in payment of demonstrator services. The court said at
994:
That which was discriminatory under the statute when done, because
wholly unrelated to any proportionalized basis or standard, cannot
subsequently, in order to enable the seller to escape damages for the
discrimination, be artificially tailored into proportionally equal terms
by fitting it to some imaginary basis or standard that has never in
fact existed.65258 F. 2d 831, 839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1958).
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proportionately equal terms, they violated Section 2(d). 66 Thus, to offer
large and small buyers alike a service which the small buyer cannot
possibly use is to fail to make the service available to him.67 However, as
will be considered later, it may be that alternative services, which the
small buyer can use may be made available to him so as to fulfill the
requirement of availability of proportionally equal terms.
Frequently, a seller will establish a cooperative-merchandising pro-
gram which fully complies with Sections 2(d) and 2(e), but which is
to be in force only until a budgeted amount of money is exhausted. In
such cases, customers are served or paid on a first-come, first-serve basis.
The latecomer may thus be denied participation in the program. Obvi-
ously, such a program is subject to abuse, since a small buyer whose
request for services may actually pre-date the request of a large buyer
may be turned down as a matter of business expediency and told that
his request came too late. It is probable that a plan under which a cus-
tomer may be denied requested participation because the budget has been
exhausted is not available to such customer, unless a deadline date for
requesting participation is established and announced to all at the out-
set of the program and is strictly adhered to by the seller. Rather than
tying such program to a rigid budget, it is suggested that the budget
be kept flexible by relating the services or payments to be made by the
seller to a maximum percentage of the buyers' purchases during a de-
fined period rather than an overall fixed dollar maximum. Then, if re-
quests for cooperative services are justified by sales, the money is avail-
able. If sales are down, so is the upper limit on cooperative expenditures.
Tying the program to sales, of course, presents the disadvantage of
having less funds available for promotions at times when sales are down
and greater promotions are most needed.
B. Proportionally Equal Terms.
"Proportionally equal terms" must be available to competing cus-
tomers in order that there be compliance with Sections 2(d) and 2(e).
The vagueness of this standard has been an unsuccessful ground for
attack upon the constitutionality of Sections 2(d) and 2(e).61 Although
66 This holding is surprising since the sellers obtained full advertising value
for the money paid, the same as if they had advertised in any independent
magazine. It is interesting to ponder how they could have made proportionally
equal terms "available" to the plaintiff when plaintiff published no magazine.
But, perhaps the result is justified if §2(d) is viewed as condemning dis-
criminatory benefits to buyers regardless of the value received by the sellers.
67 See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F. 2d 988,
994-95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). See also Elizabeth Arden,
Inc., 39 F.T.C. 288 (1944), where 90% of the customers offered services by
the defendant could not afford or qualify for them, and it was held that
§2(e) was violated.
66s"We reject the contention that the standard in §2(e) is so indefinite that
men of common intelligence cannot adequately grasp its meaning .. " Eliza-
beth Arden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
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held to be sufficiently definite to avoid a constitutional attack, the stand-
ard nevertheless is difficult to apply. Obviously, precise equality of
treatment of customers is not required, but "proportional" equality is
sufficient. It has long been established that one proper basis for pro-
portionalization is the quantity of goods purchased. 9 But, one attorney
for the Federal Trade Commission indicated that:
Although volume of purchases alone is clearly proportionable
and the reasoning of [the] cases clearly indicates that its use as
terms would satisfy the statute, the decisions should not be con-
strued to mean that volume of purchases alone, as a matter of
law, can be the only terms for furnishing or paying for services
or facilities. They go no further than to require that terms (and
services or facilities) must be capable of being proportionalized
and that they must be proportionalized so as not to exclude any
competitive customer who desires to participate; but there can
be little doubt that they do go that far.70
Other valid bases for proportionalizing terms have been suggested as:
the number of stores, with allowances granted at a stated amount per
store;7' and payment for or furnishing services in proportion to speci-
fied services furnished,7 2 such as payment of a certain amount per square
foot of window space devoted to display of the seller's goods.
The Federal Trade Commission has issued several very significant
pronouncements which have gone a long way toward establishing an
understandable and practical definition of "proportionally equal terms."
The most significant of these is found in the Commission's opinion in
what may be called the Soap cases.7 3 There the Soap Companies offered
two alternative contracts to their customers under one of which the cus-
tomer agreed to conduct a minimum of nine feature sales of the soap
products to be promoted by the buyer in newspapers, handbills or radio
advertising. Each buyer who so promoted the products was paid a speci-
fied allowance per case of the soap products purchased during a designat-
ed period. The payments ranged from 12y2 c to 20c per case for newspa-
per advertising and from Sc to 9c per case for handbill or radio advertis-
ing. Under the alternative plan, customers who did not elect to advertise,
were to be paid 6c per case purchased in return for a feature sale sup-
ported by a store display. This plan which provided for different rates
of payment for different alternative services was approved by the Com-
mission as complying with Section 2(d) because there was a difference
in cost and in the merchandising value of the services rendered, even
69 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation v. Gus Blass Co., supra note 67, impliedly
approving the standard established in Elizabeth Arden, Inc., supra note 67.
70 Layton, Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Terms, CCH ROBINSON-
PATMAN AcT SYmposiuM 38, 44 (1948).
71 AUsTIN, 145.
72 FELDMAIS & ZORN, ADVERTISING AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES (1948).
73 Lever Bros. Co. 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953), Procter & Gamble Co. 50 F.T.C. 513(1953), Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. 50 F.T.C. 525 (1953).
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though there was no showing that the cost or value of the services fur-
nished differed in exact proportion to the different rates of payment.
The Commission assumed that newspaper advertising was not prac-
tical for some customers. But, every customer could use handbills or
store displays. The Commission stated:
Nor does the law require that a comprehensive plan must be
so tailored that every feature of it will be usable or suitable or
suitable for every customer. In many cases that would be an im-
possibility.74
The other Commission pronouncement of importance is found in
the Trade Practice Rules for the Cosmetic Industry.7 - Though applicable
only to the industry indicated, these Rules nevertheless demonstrate the
latitude which the Commission is tending to employ in interpreting the
''proportionally equal" standard.
It may well be that the "principal test with respect to the 'propor-
tionally equal' payments of sellers is the good faith effort of the parties
to live up to the nondiscriminatory objectives of [§§2(d) and 2(e) [,7,6
At any rate, the Commission has said:
Consequently, every plan providing payment for promotional
services and facilities should be carefully scrutinized to see that it
does conform to the express Congressional intent. It must be
honest in its purpose and fair and reasonable in its application.77
In attempting to proportionalize terms, a seller can give no weight
to the prestige value of advertising or promotions by certain customers.7 8
Thus, even though a seller correctly feels that his product will be up-
graded because it is associated with certain high grade customers, he
74While the result reached seems laudable and desirable, one may wonder
whether or not the Commissioner may not at some future time consider this
ruling too permissive. It is considered quite possible that this liberal ruling
will later be hedged in with some restrictions.
75Trade Practice Rules for Cosmetic and Toilet Preparations Industry, 16
C.F.R. 22 0.1(g) (1960).
76 VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 25 (2d ed. 1958).
77 Lever Bros. Co., Procter & Gamble Co., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., supra
note 73. The Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity Pat-
tern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55, 61-62, n. 4 (1959), quoted the Commission's
language set forth in the text. The Court said: "We note in passing, however,
that the Commission has indicated a willingness to give a relatively broad
scope to the standard of proportional equality under §§2(d) and 2(e) . . .[citing, Lever Bros. Co., supra note 73]." A reading of the Court's footnote
leads to the observation that Simplicity might well have contended that its plan
did not violate §2(e) because alternatives were available on proportionally
equal terms to both the "Red Fronts" and the fabric stores.
78Fisher, Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Re-
visited, 11 VAND. L. R-v. 453, 471 (1958): "In other words, a seller may notgrant a greater proportional allowance to one buyer because he knows that
his product will acquire 'snob appeal' if advertised by that buyer. Conversely,
he may not grant proportionally less to another buyer because that buyer's
store is on the other side of the tracks and he knows his product will be as-
sociated with cheapness if advertised there."
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may not give that customer a greater proportional allowance than
others.7 9 It has been stated:
Any cooperative-merchandising plan considered for adoption
should be appraised and tested in terms of the benefits extended
to different competing purchasers, rather than by the seller's esti-
mate of the comparative value of the services rendered by one
purchaser as against those rendered by another. Subjective con-
siderations, such as the prestige value of displays and advertising
by certain stores, may be given little, if any, weight in propor-
tioning allowances and services among customers. s0
Thus, at a minimum, a proposed program of cooperative advertising
should be openly communicated to all customers, and if the program is
to offer services beyond the ability of some customers to supply, some
alternative service usable by and practical for such customers should be
offered. And if the rates to be paid for alternative services are to vary,
they should vary in some reasonable relation to the cost or value of the
service paid for. It is not essential that all customers actually participate
in the program, they may take-it-or-leave-it, but they must be given the
choice.8
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING SEcTION 2(d) OR SECTION 2(e).
The violation of Section 2(d) or Section 2(e) may result in pro-
ceedings of four types,8 2 but consideration is here given only to the
action before the Commission resulting from the Commission complaint
which culminates in a cease and desist order and private treble damage
suits. And the Commission proceeding is discussed only to note that
the resulting cease and desist order can often be very difficult to live
with and may often hamper future legitimate conduct of business.
Incidentally, the cease and desist order does not become final or en-
forceable by the lapse of time, and before the Commission can enforce
79 Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 288 (1944).80 AUsTn, 146.
81 See CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 53980, F.T.C., Guides for Allowances and Services,
May 19, 1960. These guides are general but they may be of assistance in ap-
praising the legality of a proposed program. For a consideration of these Guides
in some detail, see, Shiderman, supra note 23, at 410-21, where it is stated
that the Guides "are destined to become an important part of the learning in
this field!' Id. at 421.
82 These four types are:
(1) A suit by private parties injured by the discrimination for treble
damages. (§4, Clayton Act). 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1958).(2) A proceeding before the Commission brought upon complaint of
the Commission resulting in a cease and desist order. (§11, Clayton
Act). 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1958, and supp.).(3) An injunction suit by the United States, under direction of the
Attorney General. (§15, Clayton Act). 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C.§25 (1958). This type is rarely used.
(4) A suit by a private person for an injunction against threatened
damage. (§16, Clayton Act). 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1958).
This type is frequently combined with a private treble damage claim.
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such order, it must prove two subsequent violations of Section 2(d)
or Section 2(e). 3
In a treble damage suit for violation of one of these sections, the
plaintiff seeks to recover three times the damages he sustained in his
business or property by reason of the violation. But, before a court can
multiply by three, it must determine the damage figure which is to be
multiplied. The determination of this figure is less than an exact science.
The early tendency of courts was to require only rather liberal and
inexact proof of damages. In one case,8 4 the court required only a show-
ing that a discrimination in price enabled plaintiff's competitor to under-
sell plaintiff, and that plaintiff lost business as a result, in order to take
the case to the jury. It did not require plaintiff to prove the amount of
profits lost. The theory was that a "wrongdoer" could not take refuge
behind the indefiniteness of plaintiff's proof of damages. Subsequent
cases established that this decision is wrong.
However, Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court
characterized the problem of the measurement of damages under the
Clayton Act as "rather difficult."8' 5 His opinion in Bruce's Juices"6 then
went on to add to the difficulty. In dictum he indicated that if there was
proof of an illegal discrimination, that proof alone is sufficient to entitle
plaintiff to recover and the amount of the discrimination is prima facie
the measure of damages. This dictum has not been followed, however,
the principle had earlier been applied in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corpora-
tion v. Gus Blass Co.,8 7 a suit for damages because of violation of Sec-
tion 2(d). In Gus Blass the court measured damages by the amount of
the discrimination. The seller made payments toward the salary of a
clerk employed by the buyer, who also demonstrated the seller's product.
For one buyer, the seller paid the total salary-for plaintiff, only one-
half. The court allowed the buyer on the short end to recover three
times the difference in amounts paid by the seller as demonstrators'
salaries. As will be shown later, however, the Gus Blass decision is
contrary to the trend of more recent cases requiring more strict and
accurate proof of damages in discrimination cases, one of which was
decided by the same court which decided Gus Blass."" In the Russellville
case, the court held that there must be proof that the discrimination
resulted in ascertainable damage to the plaintiff's business1 9
The most significant case in the determination of damages under
83 AUSTIN, 169-170.
84 American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. 2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930).
s5 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 335 U.S. 743, 753 (1947).
86 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., supra note 85.
87 150 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
8 8 Russellville Canning Company v. American Can Co., 191 F. 2d 38 (8th Cir.
1951).
89 This case was decided under Section 2(a) but is applicable to §§2(d) and 2(e)
as well.
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Sections 2(d) and 2(e) is the Sun Cosmetic9" case. There the defendant
furnished a demonstrator free of charge to plaintiff's competitor, but
did not furnish any such service to plaintiff or pay any salary to a
demonstrator in plaintiff's store. The court held that the only proper
proof of damages is loss to the plaintiff's business. The salary of a
demonstrator is not such a loss, since in and of itself it showed no loss
to plaintiff. However, such salary was held to be the upper limit on
plaintiff's recovery for,
if the loss caused by the diversion of its customers to favored
'agencies' was greater than the cost of employing a 'demonstrator,'
it would be its [plaintiff's] duty to minimize the damages by
employing one.91
This principle of mitigation would seem to have wide application in suits
for violation of Sections 2(d) and 2(e). As illustrated in the Sun
Cosmetic case, the fact that customer A has a demonstrator and that
customer B does not, does not establish that B has lost any sales or
profits. The same thing would be true if customer A were furnished
display cabinets while customer B was not, or A was reimbursed for
advertising while B was not. Assume that B can prove he has lost profits
in the amount of $1,000 because these payments or services were not
furnished to him. If the cost of the services were $200, under the hold-
ing in Sun Cosmetic, B would not be entitled to recover three times
$1,000 since he had a duty to spend the $200 and purchase the services
himself in order to reduce his damages. If B could not prove that he
lost any profits because of the lack of the services, he should recover
nothing. Even though A would have received a $200 payment or $200
worth of services and is better off than B, B has nevertheless lost nothing.
In the Gus Blass case both plaintiff and his favored competitor had
the demonstrator service available. So it cannot be contended that
plaintiff lost sales because of the discrimination. But it cost plaintiff
more than it cost his competitor since he was reimbursed for only one-
half of the demonstrator's salary. The doctrine of Sun Cosmetic would
require that plaintiff Gus Blass recover nothing.9 2
Thus, it now appears from the more recent and better reasoned cases,
that a treble damage plaintiff must prove with accuracy that a violation
of Section 2(d) or Section 2(e) caused ascertainable damage to his sales
and profits and that such damages cannot be shown merely by proving
90 Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation, 178 F. 2d 150 (2d
Cir. 1949).
91 Id. at 153.
92 "There only remains the question whether the measure of the plaintiff's
damage can in any event be the salary of a 'demonstrator.' The Eighth Circuit
by a divided court [in Gus Blass] held that it can, and we agree that it
would be a proper limit upon the plaintiff's recovery; . . . but we do not
think that it is otherwise relevant." Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corporation, supra note 90, at 153.
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a discrimination. And the extension of the "mitigation principle" an-
nounced by Judge Learned Hand in Sun Cosmetic would go far to
minimize the impact of a treble damage suit upon the violating seller.
This seems salutary, particularly because the intricacies of the Robin-
son-Patman Act create the possibility that even a seller acting in com-
plete good faith will violate the Act. It is enough of a penalty to require
such a seller to pay three times the damages he causes. It would be un-
conscionable to additionally relieve the plaintiff of his burden of proving
that he was damaged.
